Words “So Indefinite, Ambiguous and Incertain” That They Aren’t Treated as Slanderous
This is a familiar principle in modern defamation law: Some words, however pejorative, are treated as too general to be the sorts of factual allegations that can count as defamation. I just came across the same principle in Marshall v. Addison (Md. Provincial Ct. 1773), and thought it formed a good illustration of how long Anglo-American law has been dealing with these questions:
THIS was an action of Slander. The declaration contained three counts. The first and second counts, for saying the plaintiff was “a rogue and villain, and that he had ruined many families, and the curses of the widows and children were on him,” &c. “that he had wronged the defendant’s father’s estate, and cheated the defendant’s brother Thomas.” …
There are three heads und
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