What Process Is Due Before Property Is Destroyed?
The McIntoshes own a mobile home park in Madisonville, Kentucky. After a tenant complained, the city found mold and mildew in one of the homes, condemned it, and ordered it demolished. The McIntoshes challenged the city’s action (albeit after the home was destroyed) on several legal grounds, but the trial court was unmoved. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, found the trial court was too quick to dismiss the procedural due process claim.
Chief Judge Sutton summarized the case.
The City of Madisonville condemned one of several mobile homes that Michael and Rebecca McIntosh own in their Kentucky town. The City demolished the property a month later. The McIntoshes filed this § 1983 action in response, alleging that the City deprived them of their due process rights to notice and the opportunity to be heard before tearing down the mobile home, among other claims. The district court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment. Because triable issues remain over whether the City provided the McIntoshes an adequate opportunity to be heard, we reverse its disposition of this claim and affirm its handling of the other claims.
On the McIntoshes’ procedural due process claim, the city may have provided them with adequate notice, but they do not appear to have given them an adequate opportunity to be heard to contest the condemnation and prevent the property’s destruction. In particular, the city had no process n place to provide the hearing called for by the city’s own municipal code. (Apparently city officials preferred to “sit down and have a conversation with” affected property owners.)
Judge Murphy offered an additional concurrence that is worth a read. It explores how the expansion of Due Process protections to a broader category of claims created countervailing pressure to lessen the degree of protection provided. I’ve posted the text after the break.
This case shows that an evolving-standards approach to constitutional interpretation can destroy rights just as much as it can create them. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause makes it illegal for a State to “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. This constitutional text raises two basic questions: Has a State threatened to deprive a person of “life, liberty, or property”? If so, what is the “process” that is “due” for this threatened deprivation?
Historically, the Due Process Clause provided capacious protections (“due process of law”) to a modest set of interests (“life, liberty, or property”). To start, the words “life, liberty, or property” traditionally reached only a “a small collection of rights.” Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. Ct. Rev. 85, 97–98. They referred to what William Blackstone called “the ‘absolute’ rights” of individuals in the state of nature and what we would call “private rights” today. Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 566–67 (2007); see 2 St. George Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries 123–24, 128–29 (1803). According to Blackstone, a person’s specific right to “property” “consist[ed] in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without
Article from Reason.com
The Reason Magazine website is a go-to destination for libertarians seeking cogent analysis, investigative reporting, and thought-provoking commentary. Championing the principles of individual freedom, limited government, and free markets, the site offers a diverse range of articles, videos, and podcasts that challenge conventional wisdom and advocate for libertarian solutions. Whether you’re interested in politics, culture, or technology, Reason provides a unique lens that prioritizes liberty and rational discourse. It’s an essential resource for those who value critical thinking and nuanced debate in the pursuit of a freer society.
