What Does “Corruptly” Mean? The Justices Really Do Not Want To Tell Us
Some federal criminal statutes require the mens rea of “corruptly.” What does “corruptly” mean? In two cases this term, the Supreme Court has shied away from clearly defining this state of mind.
28 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), the statute at issue in Fischer v. United States, provides:
(c) Whoever corruptly—
(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding; or
(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
Much of Fischer turned on whether the word “otherwise” limited the offenses in (c)(2) to the types of offenses in (c)(1). The majority opinion, by Chief Justice Roberts, found that (c)(1) did limit (c)(2), and the latter was not a “catchall” provision of all other obstruction offenses. Justice Barrett’s dissent rejected that reading. Justice Jackson was, perhaps, the surprise vote, as she joined the majority. However, Jackson wrote a separate concurrence that distanced herself from what might be called statutory original meaning, and instead tried to determine legislative intent.
Who got it right? To use Loper Bright as a model, what is the “best” reading of the statute? And we know that there certainly can only be one “best” reading of a statute. This case is tough. In the court below, I was persuaded by Judge Katsas’s dissent, which Chief Justice Roberts repeatedly relied on. Still, I found parts of Justice Barrett’s analysis compelling. For all of my criticism of Barrett’s background as a law professor–and others are making similar points–she shines with a question of statutory interpretation. This is the sort of case that will appear in all statutory interpretation casebooks. Barrett’s discussion of hypothetical statutes, and responses to the Chief’s zoo and football analogies, were very sharp. On balance, I think this is a close call. I can hear Justice Gorsuch screaming “rule of lenity” in the back of my head, so I would probably rule for the defendant here. But my interest here focuses on the mens rea of the statute, which did not directly inform the Court’s holding.
Section 1512(c) only applies to one who takes the prescribed acts “corruptly.” What does corruptly mean? The Justices really do not want to tell us.
Chief Justice Roberts explains that the government does not provide a specific definition of corruptly in this statute:
But the Government concedes that “Congress did not define ‘corruptly’ for purposes of Section 1512.” Id., at 44. And while the Government suggests that “corruptly” is “‘normally associated with wrongful, immoral, depraved, or evil’ conduct,” ibid. (quoting Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U. S. 696, 705 (2005)), it never persuasively explains how “knowingly us[ing] intimidation” or “threat[s]” against
Article from Reason.com
The Reason Magazine website is a go-to destination for libertarians seeking cogent analysis, investigative reporting, and thought-provoking commentary. Championing the principles of individual freedom, limited government, and free markets, the site offers a diverse range of articles, videos, and podcasts that challenge conventional wisdom and advocate for libertarian solutions. Whether you’re interested in politics, culture, or technology, Reason provides a unique lens that prioritizes liberty and rational discourse. It’s an essential resource for those who value critical thinking and nuanced debate in the pursuit of a freer society.